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Abstract
This paper examines the effects of institutional trading on stock prices, using a unique data set.
This data set records all transactions, both small and large, made by 37 large institutional money
management firms. The direction of each trade, as well as the identity of the manager behind each
trade, are identified. Analysis of the price impact of institutional trades sheds light on the elasticity of
the demand for stocks, and on the magnitude of the cost of executing transactions. While our findings
indicate that institutional purchases and sales of a stock are associated with some pressure on prices, the
magnitude of the price impact is much smaller than in previous research. We also document a marked
asymmetry between the price impact of buys versus sells, and provide several conjectures as to their
underlying differences. While the market impact of a trade is related to market capitalization and
relative trade size, their importance pales in comparison to the influence of the money manager who is
behind the trade.

Trading on equity markets has become increasingly dominated by institutional investors. It has
been estimated that in 1989 about seventy percent of trading volume on the New York Stock Exchange
is accounted for by member firms and institutional investors (Schwartz and Shapiro (1990)). In light of
their importance, the impact of institutional trading on stock prices has been the subject of increased
attention. It has been suggested, for example, that the increased concentration of trading into
institutional hands may be potentially destabilizing by increasing intra-day price volatility (Report for the
New York Stock Exchange's Panel on Market Volatility and Investor Confidence, 1990; Schwartz 1991).
The responsiveness of prices to buying or selling pressure depends, in general, upon the features
of the market mechanism whereby trades are carried out. These features include, amongst other things,
whether trading occurs in a continuous auction or periodic call market, whether orders are submitted as
market or limit orders, and whether orders are handled by a designated specialist or by competitive
market-makers. Markets with mechanisms which facilitate the provision of liquidity will, other things
equal, exhibit less price volatility in response to order imbalances (Harris (1990)). Hence, an evaluation
of the market impact of institutional trades is of concern to policymakers, researchers and exchange
officials.
It is also of great interest to institutional investors themselves to evaluate the market impact of
their own trades. Researchers,in evaluating the profitability of various trading rules also find it
necessary to measure the costs of trading. Numerous studies document the inability of portfolio
managers to out-perform various passive benchmarks, despite the considerable effort to analyze and
select stocks (Brinson, Singer and Beebower (1991), Fama (1991)). This "implementation shortfall" may
be due to the costliness of actually executing trades (Perold (1988)). The adjustment of stock prices to
buying or selling pressure constitutes one form of trading cost. High trading costs from demanding
immediacy, for example, may offset the benefits of advance information or a trading rule, yielding
inferior performance. Indeed, the heavy expenditure of resources by institutions on trading facilities,
personnel and computerized trading systems suggests that the execution costs of institutional trades
might not be negligible and, moreover, that they are potentially controllable (Schwartz and Wbitcomb
(1988), Bodurtha and Quinn (1990)). Such costs are likely to vary across managers with different
investment or trading styles, and depend upon the size or difficulty of the transaction.
Academic interest in the effects of institutional trading has focussed on block trades (Kraus and
Stoll (1972), Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers (1987, 1990), Ball and Finn (1989)). These studies
compare the price at which a large block transaction is executed either with the prices of adjacent
transactions in the same stock, or with closing prices. In a frictionless market with no information
effects, the market price should not be affected by trades. Any impact of trades on prices is thus
consistent with the presence of new information conveyed by large transactions (Kyle (1985), Easley and
2O'Hara (1987)), or with the existence of various kinds of market frictions. Such frictions might reflect
the existence of different forms of liquidity costs, including the costs of processing orders (Demsetz
(1968)) or compensation for inventory imbalances (Amihud and Mendelson (1980), Ho and Stoll (1981).
Alternatively the market price of a stock may be affected by shifts in excess demand because investors
may not recognize the existence of close substitutes for an individual stock. Measuring the impact of
institutional trades on prices thus allows an evaluation of the importance of these different effects on the
flow demand/supply schedules for stocks.
This paper examines the effects of institutional trading on stock prices, using a unique data set.
This data set reports all transactions made by a sample of 37 large institutional money management
firms over the course of two and a half years. Each transaction is explicitly identified as a purchase or
sale by the manager in question; the money manager associated with each trade is also identified. Their
trades number more than a million transactions, both small and large, involving issues listed on the New
York and American Stock Exchanges. In all, about 5 percent of the dollar value traded on these two
exchanges is accounted for. The impact of institutional trades is evaluated by comparing the price at
which the transaction is executed with a variety of benchmark price measures on the date of the trade.
Tracking the intra-day behavior of prices around institutional trades allows an evaluation of their price
impact of institutional trades and aids in disentangling alternative explanations for the sources of such
market impact.
The distinctive features of our data set permit several fresh new insights on the price impact of
institutional trades in general. Our findings suggest that both institutional purchases and sales are
accompanied by some price pressure relative to the opening price on the trade date. However, there is a
marked asymmetry between the behavior of prices after purchases and after sales. Subsequent to buys,
the stock price continues to appreciate, while the price almost fully recovers after sales to its prior level:
as a result, the principal-weighted average price change from the open to the close on the trade day for
buys is 0.34 percent, while the corresponding average price change for sells is -0.04 percent. This
asymmetry is intriguing, and we provide several conjectures as to its underlying source, related to the
effects of short-run liquidity costs, imperfect substitution between stocks, information effects and money
managers' behavior. The price impact of buy and sell transactions is related to the market capitalization
of the stock, and to the relative difficulty of the trade (measured as the principal value relative to normal
daily trading volume in the stock )< A much more dominant influence on the trade's price impact,
however, is the identity of the money manager who is behind the trade: our results suggest considerable
differences across money managers with respect to their execution ability.
While our findings indicate that institutional trades are associated with some impact on stock
prices, the magnitude of the effect pales in comparison to the figures reported by previous authors.
3Kraus and Stoll (1972), for example, find that the permanent price change using closing prices for buys
is 1.41%, while our findings suggest that the open-to-close average price change for buys is only 0.34
percent. The low magnitude of the price impact also has strong implications for the much-debated issue
of the market impact cost of executing trades. A manager who gives up only an eighth of a point each
way would incur a round-trip cost of 0.68 percent on a typical stock. In contrast, we are hard-pressed to
find a round-trip market impact cost, in the aggregate over all trades, exceeding 0.36 percent. The
modest estimates of market impact costs attest to the keenly competitive nature of the money
management industry.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I provides a review of the literature
and outlines alternative explanations for the price impact of trades. Section II describes the data and
presents summary statistics on the characteristics of institutional trades. The empirical results are
described in section HI. Section IV relates our results on the price impact of trades to the question of
measuring the costs of executing trades. A final section provides the conclusions.
I. Literature Review
Several studies have explored the behavior of stock prices around large trades. These studies in
general focussed on block trades (trades over 10,000 shares) and used the tick test to classify trades as
buyer or seller initiated. Block trades at a price below (above) the price prior to the block were
considered to be seller (buyer) initiated. Zero tick trades were in general not classified.
Three potential explanations for price changes triggered by large trades have been suggested in the
literature: (i) short run liquidity costs, (ii) imperfect substitution, and (iii) information effects.
Short run liquidity costs arise because of the difficulty in finding immediately willing buyers or
sellers. This results in temporary buying or selling pressure that translates into a price concession. In
many large trades, block traders provide some of the liquidity, and are compensated at least in part by a
price concession. A timely return of prices following a trade to the prior equilibrium is consistent with
this explanation.
Prices will also change around large trades if there are no perfect substitutes for a particular
stock. Hence, a seller will face a downward sloping demand curve and a buyer an upward sloping supply
curve. Thus, the seller in a large transaction will have to offer a discount to induce buyers to absorb the
extra shares. Similarly, a premium has to be offered by the buyer in a large transaction. It stands to
4reason that the slope of the demand and supply curves will depend on the length of the horizon, although
this point has not been discussed in the literature. The imperfect substitution hypothesis is consistent
with permanent price changes or much slower reversals following the trade, compared to the predictions
of the short run liquidity hypothesis.
Permanent price changes caused by large trades are also expected if the trades convey private
information which is impounded into the new equilibrium price subsequent to the trade. Informed
sellers believe that the stock is overpriced, and informed buyers that the stock is underpriced. The
information effect depends on the identity of the buyer or seller (informed versus uninformed) and in
many studies the size of a transaction was used as a proxy for the information content of the trade.
Prior evidence on the price impact of block trades includes papers by Kraus and Stol! (1972),
Holthausen, Leftwich, and Mayers (1987, 1990), and Ball and Finn (1989). Kraus and Stoll (1972) found
that the block price for sells was substantially below the price prior to the block. However, subsequent to
the block there was a price rise of .71 percent. Overall, they viewed their evidence for sells as supporting
the short run liquidity hypothesis. For buys, Kraus and Stoll observed that the trade price was
substantially above prior prices. However, in contrast to sells, the price increase seems to be permanent,
a result consistent with the information hypothesis. The asymmetry between buys and sells was also
noted by Holthausen, Leftwich, and Mayers (1987). Both papers also explored the association between
price effects and the size of the block. In general, the association was found to be stronger for sells than
for buys.
Holthausen, Leftwich, and Mayers (1990) obtained results that are somewhat different from
those in their earlier paper and in Kraus and Stoll (1972). They found that there is a substantial
permanent effect associated with block trades, not only for buyer initiated trades, but also for seller
initiated trades. Moreover, the effect is related to the size of the transaction for both types of trades.
Ball and Finn (1989) utilize data from the Sydney Stock Exchange (a non-dealer auction market) and
found substantial permanent effects for buys and sells. They interpret their results as consistent with
the information hypothesis.
All of the above studies relied on the tick test to classify trades as buys or sells. The accuracy of
this procedure was explored by Holthausen, Leftwich, and Mayers (1987) who analyzed 104 trades that
5were known to be buyer initiated. They found that the tick rule properly classified only 52.8 percent of
the trades. A more recent paper by Lee and Ready (1991) points out the various problems associated
with trade-classification rules that are based on prior prices and quote data. Our paper avoids the
classification problem because we have an explicit buy/sell indicator for each transaction.
Other studies, such as Scholes (1972) and Mikkelson and Partch (1985) that examined secondary
offerings, and Asquith and Mullins (1986) and Loderer, Cooney and Van Drunen (1991) that examined
seasoned equity offerings, observed a price drop upon announcement. This price drop is consistent with
information effects or downward sloping demand curves. The paper by Loderer, Cooney, and Drunen
(1991) makes a special effort to distinguish between the two possible effects. They show that adverse
information cannot account for the drop in price, and conclude that the observed price changes reflect
downward sloping demand curves. In a somewhat different context, Harris and Gurel (1986) and
Shleifer (1986) investigate the price behavior of stocks upon their addition to the Standard and Poor's
500 Index. Both studies find substantial positive abnormal returns at the announcement date of the
event. Their findings are consistent with downward sloping demand curves, at least over short horizons.
Transaction Data
This study utilizes a unique data set which contains transactions made by 37 large money
management firms. The period covered is two and a half years, from July 1986 until the end of 1988.
The data set identifies each transaction as a purchase or a sale, as well as the identity of the money
manager behind each of the trades. This enables us to conduct a comparison across money managers.
Such a comparison can shed some light on the determinants of execution costs. The data do not contain
a time stamp and hence we cannot identify the prices immediately before and after the trade. However,
to understand how trades are being executed, what is relevant in many cases is not what happened prior
to the trade, but the market conditions when the decision to trade was actually made by the portfolio
manager (which could be a considerable amount of time earlier than the trade). Such information of
course is not in general available.
Table I provides some description of our sample. We analyze a total of 1,233,387 transactions
and a dollar value traded of 387.6 billion dollars. This is a very large data base when compared to
6previous studies in this area, and accounts for about 5 percent of the dollar value traded on NYSE and
AMEX. Consistent with a recent paper by Lakonishok, Shleifer, Vishny, and Thaler (1991), most of the
trading activity of institutions is in the largest stocks. The top decile by market capitalization accounts
for 48 percent of the trades and 61 percent of the dollar value traded. In contrast, the bottom 40
percent of the stocks by market capitalization account for 3.7 percent of the trades and only 0.6 percent
of the dollar value traded.
Previous studies, to capture institutional transactions, focused on trades that exceed 10,000
shares. Our results indicate that many of the institutional trades are actually quite small. Table II
presents the distribution of various trade statistics for buys and sells. The results in Panel A are for the
number of shares per trade. The average number of shares per trade is only 8400 for buys and 9100 for
sells, and the medians are 2400 and 2700 for buys and sells, respectively. Moreover, 25 percent of the
trades involve less than 1000 shares, and only about 20 percent of the trades involve more than 10,000
shares. The surprisingly small size of a typical trade is not caused by our sample composition. If
anything, our data comes from large money managers which are expected to be involved in larger trades.
The small trade sizes relative to typical holdings are consistent with managers trading in such a way as
to reduce the influence of: (1) short run liquidity costs, or (2) information effects which are related to
the transaction size.
Previous studies have also found that the number of blocks traded on a downtick substantially
exceeds the number of blocks traded on an uptick. One explanation for the phenomenon is that it is
easier to sell large amounts than to buy large amounts. Therefore, we expect to find that the sells are
larger than the corresponding purchases. This is indeed the case, although the differences are quite
small. For example, in the largest stocks, the mean number of shares traded is 8700 and 8200 for buys
and sells, respectively. 1
Panel B (Table II) presents the distribution of the dollar value of trades. The median trade is
less than $100,000 and only about 6 percent of the trades exceed $1,000,000. As the company size
increases, the trade gets large. In Panel C, we report the distribution of trade size relative to normal
daily trading volume, the median is only 2 percent indicating that a typical institutional trade is not a
major event. However, as the size of the companies decreases, the typical institutional trade becomes a
7more significant event. For example, the median for buys is 0.24 in group 1, relative to 0.01 in group 4.
The largest 1 percent of trades are many times larger than the typical daily volume in small stocks,
whereas in the largest stocks such trades are typically less than 40 percent of the daily volume. Many
studies focused on trades which were larger than the typical trading volume. Our results indicate that
such trades are very uncommon at least in the more liquid stocks where most of the institutional
holdings are concentrated.
1H. Empirical Results
1. The Price Impact of Institutional Purchases and Sales
Table 3 summarizes the price impact of institutional purchases (panel (a)) and institutional sales
(panel (b)) f together with the percentage commission cost. For each transaction, the percentage return is
calculated from the day's opening price to the trade, and from the trade to the closing price; the price
change from the opening to the closing is also reported. These correspond, respectively, to the total,
temporary and permanent price effects discussed in Holthausen et al. (1987). Further, to determine
whether a typical institutional trade is fundamentally distinguishable from other trades, we compare the
transaction price in a stock to three intra-day average prices: the volume-weighted average of all
transaction prices in the same stock on the trade date; the volume-weighted average obtained when the
trade under consideration is excluded, and the simple average of all transaction prices in the same stock
on the trade date. In the subsequent discussion, we focus on the principal-weighted average of each price
impact measure. This follows the norm in the investment industry, and permits evaluation of the overall
dollar amount of the price impact. Prices for institutional purchases are, on a principal-weighted
average basis, 0.22 percent higher than the opening price on the trade date. This difference amounts to
eight cents per share, less than one tick, on a stock with a price of $36.50 (the average price over our
sample period).
Several factors could account for the price increase from the open to the trade. In part, the rise
reflects the average daily upward drift in prices, although this component is sraall-the mean total
percentage change from the open to the close on the Standard and Poor's Composite Index over this
period is 0.06 percent. On the other hand, the increase is consistent with the short-run liquidity cost
8hypothesis. The change from the opening to the trade may simply reflect an upward movement to the
ask price for institutional purchases. Alternatively this price increase might reflect favorable
information. A final interpretation of the price movement from the open to the trade recognizes that
institutional money managers may be passively responding to changes in the stock price before initiating
transactions. In particular, increases in the stock price from the opening (perhaps as a result of good
news) may prompt institutions to begin to purchase.
Subsequent to the purchase, there is a further principal-weighted average price increase of
0.12 percent from the trade to the closing price. This post-trade behavior provides one basis for
discriminating between the different accounts described above. The price continuation after the
purchase is sharply at odds with the reversal predicted by the short-run liquidity hypothesis. On the
other hand, the reversal may take place over a period of more than one trading day. A more gradual
adjustment of prices after a trade is consistent with the hypothesis that individual stocks are imperfect
substitutes. Permanent effects on prices are also predicted if new information is conveyed by trades.
Another possibility is that the price pressure after the trade is a result of follow-up trades in the same
stock. These additional trades might be initiated by the same manager as part of a larger trading
program, or by other managers, to the extent that they engage in "herding" behavior.
For institutional purchases, the permanent principal-weighted price change from the open to the
close is 0.34 percent. The simple mean price change is also very similar, at 0.26 percent. While this is
much larger than the average open-to-close return of 0.06 percent for the Standard and Poor's
Composite, it is nonetheless considerably smaller than previous estimates of the price impact of block
purchases. Kraus and Stoll (1972) found that the price for buy blocks is on average 0.75 percent higher
than the prior price (1.50% higher than the previous closing price), followed by a decline of 0.09 percent
to the day's closing price. Holthausen et al. (1990) report that the return from the price prior to the
block to the trade price is 1.18 percent, which is subsequently reversed by a decline of 0.13 percent to
yield a permanent price change of 1.05 percent. These studies, however, focussed only on large block
transactions. In addition, their reliance on the tick test to infer trade direction results in the exclusion of
blocks associated with zero price ticks. It is also quite probable that the remaining transactions (those
associated with an up- or down tick) represent trades initiated by relatively less patient investors (i.e.
9those willing to pay a larger price concession in exchange for greater immediacy). In this respect, the
average price impact is likely to be larger in the case of purchases or sales selected on the basis of a non-
zero tick, compared to purchases or sales in general (whether initiated by the investor or not). It is thus
not surprising that larger price effects are documented in the earlier papers. 2
Both the principal-weighted and simple mean price impacts may be influenced by large,
unrepresentative transactions. Accordingly, Table 3 also reports the median and other percentiles for
each measure of price impact. Relative to the open or the close, the median return for buys is zero while
the median change from open to close for buys is also zero. Evidently, the typical institutional purchase
has little or no impact on prices. However, the percentiles of the distribution of returns indicate that
there is substantial dispersion across trades with respect to their price impact, suggesting that other
factors may be at work as well.
Another perspective on the price impact of institutional orders is obtained by comparing the
trade price to an average of transaction prices from the same day. Berkowitz, Logue and Noser (1988)
interpret the price impact relative to the volume-weighted average price as a measure of execution cost.
Using this benchmark, the dollar-weighted average impact is very small, at 0.02 percent. Similar values
are obtained if the calculation of the volume-weighted price excludes the trade under consideration, or if
the simple average price is used as the benchmark.3 The median percentage difference under any of the
three intra-day average price benchmarks suggests that the typical institutional purchase can be
accommodated with virtually no market impact. Indeed, the simple average impact relative to these
benchmarks is slightly negative, which would imply, under the interpretation of Berkowitz, Logue and
Noser (1988), a negative execution cost on average to buying!
Turning to institutional sales (panel (b) of Table 3), there is an initial principal-weighted average
drop in prices of 0.14 percent from the open to the trade. As in the case for buys, many of the same
factors can account for this change—a movement from the open down to a bid price, leakage of
unfavorable information or institutional sales may be triggered by price changes beforehand. In marked
contrast to the behavior of prices after buys, however, the initial price decline is almost fully reversed by
the subsequent average return of 0.10 percent to the close. As a result, there is only a small permanent
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change of -0.04 percent. The post-trade behavior of prices in the case of sells is thus more supportive of
effects due to short-term liquidity costs, rather than imperfect substitution or information.
The results in Table 3(b) are reminiscent of the findings in Kraus and Stoll (1972) and
Holthausen et al (1990). In comparison to these earlier studies, however, both the principal-weighted
and simple mean percentage returns in panel (b) of Table 3 are much smaller, and the median impact
relative to either the open or close is zero. Furthermore, the prices at which institutional trades are
executed do not differ greatly from the average price over the course of the day. The principal-weighted
average percentage differences range from -0.07 percent using the volume-weighted average price, to
-0.10 percent using the simple average price as the benchmark. Overall, the evidence suggests that
institutional sales are associated with some downward pressure on prices, although the market impact is
generally small and temporary in nature.
It might be argued that the differences between the findings in Table 3 and the findings of
earlier research are due to differences in commission rates. If the specialist or block trader on the other
side of the trade receives compensation in the form of a commission as well as a price concession, then a
lower concession might be exchanged for a higher commission. Similarly, differences between the
commission rates for purchases and sales might account for the differential price impact. In Table 3,
however, the principal-weighted commission rate is the same for buys and sells, at 0.17 percent of trade
value (six cents per share on a stock with the average price of $36.50). Furthermore, the simple average
commission rate, 0.23 percent, is much smaller than the mean commission rate of 1.01 percent for the
largest stocks over the period 1960 to 1979, reported by Stoll and Whaley (1983).
2. The Asymmetric Response of Prices to Purchases and Sales
A key puzzle emerges from Table 3: there is a marked asymmetry between the effect of
institutional buying and selling activity on stock prices. Figure 1 plots the principal-weighted return
from the open to the trade, and from the trade to the close.4 Purchases of a stock are accompanied by
an increase in its price, which continues to rise after the trade; sales of a stock are accompanied by a
drop in its price, but there is subsequently an almost complete recovery in the price.
Several conjectures can be offered to account for the asymmetry between the price impact of
buys and sells. The larger, positive impact of institutional purchases could arise if institutions are
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positive feedback traders for buys but not for sells, i.e., they tend to intensify their buying behavior on
days when the market rises. This explanation, however, is not compatible with the data. On days when
there is buying activity, the average return from the open to the close on the Standard & Poor's
Composite Index, weighted by the dollar value of purchases, is 0.05 percent. The corresponding
principal-weighted return for days when there is selling activity is actually higher at 0.08 percent. If
anything, this finding suggests that institutional money managers might make markets more stable by
their negative feedback strategies.
Several other factors, not mutually exclusive, might account for the differences between the
effects of buying and selling activity. "Street wisdom" suggests that brokers are willing to accommodate
customers' sales by purchasing shares and holding them in inventory. In exchange, sellers pay a short-
term liquidity cost in the form of a price concession to the broker. On the other hand, brokers are more
reluctant to accommodate customers' purchases by undertaking short positions. Instead, an institution
who wishes to purchase shares will generally have to deal directly with existing holders of the stock.
Since an intermediary is less likely to be involved in purchases, it is less likely that the transaction price
incorporates a fee to the intermediary in the form of a temporary price concession.6
Information effects are also more probable for purchases than for sales. Substantially more
attention is devoted within the securities industry to generating buy recommendations than sell
recommendations (Lakonishok and Maberly (1990)). A money manager who chooses to act on a buy
recommendation will generally have to reallocate funds in the portfolio away from other stocks. Since an
institutional investor typically does not hold the market portfolio, the choice of a particular issue to sell,
out of the limited alternatives in a portfolio, does not necessarily convey negative information. Rather,
the stocks which are sold may already have met the portfolio's objectives, or there may be other
mechanical rules, unrelated to expectations about future performance, for reducing a position. As a
result, there are many liquidity-motivated reasons to dispose of a stock. In contrast, the choice of one
specific issue to buy, out of the numerous possibilities on the market, is likely to convey favorable firm-
specific news. Under this interpretation, the asymmetric impact of buys versus sells can be attributed to
their different information content, at least on average.6
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Conversations with money managers suggest another behavioral interpretation of the differences
between the effects of buys and sells. Most managers target for inclusion in their portfolios stocks that
they believe are undervalued at current prices. A slight increase in the price of such a stock might
engender fears that the stock will "run away" from the manager. Hence the price increase will not deter
the manager from buying the stock, perhaps contributing further price pressure. On the other hand such
a manager displays more patience in selling; if the stock price falls, the manager is likely to defer selling
activity, feeling that the price will ultimately rebound to its higher true value.
In summary, the price impact of sales is not merely the reverse of the impact of purchases.
While the behavior of the stock price after buys reflects new information or inelastic excess demand
curves, the price behavior after sells is more indicative of a liquidity-related reversal. In any case, the
average and median price effects are not large, and execution prices for institutional trades do not differ
very much from average prices over the course of the day.
3. The Role of Firm Size
Prior research, both theoretical and empirical, suggests that the price impact of a trade is
affected by various other considerations. In light of the numerous proposals for trading rules based on
low capitalization stocks, the price impact of trades in small stocks is of special interest. Loeb (1983),
Stoll and Whaley (1983) report that dealer spreads and commission costs are higher for smaller firms
than for large firms. In Table 4, results are presented for trades classified into four categories according
to the market capitalization of the stock. The cut-off points for each category are determined every
quarter, by ranking all NYSE and AMEX firms on the CRSP tape in terms of the market value of equity
outstanding at the end of the prior quarter. The group of smallest firms comprises the first 40 percent
of firms ranked in this manner, the second group comprises the next 40 percent; the third group
comprises firms in the ninth decile while the final group is made up of firms in the top decile of the
distribution.
In the case of buys (Table 4A), price effects relative to the open and close indeed vary with the
market value of equity. With the exception of the category of smallest firms, the return from the open
rises monotonically as firm size declines. Subsequent to the trade, price continuations are stronger after
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purchases of smaller stocks. Taken together, the average price change from open to close on days with
institutional purchases is positive and tends to be higher for smaller firms. The principal-weighted
average permanent open-to-close return ranges from 0.28 percent for the largest firms to 0.49 for the
smallest. For sell orders (Table 4B), the principal-weighted average drop from the opening price to the
execution price also tends to be larger, the smaller the firm. However, the subsequent recovery in the
price is also stronger for smaller firms. As a result, there is no clear pattern across the four size groups
with respect to the permanent price change—the price remains roughly unchanged or declines slightly
from the open to the close.
It is evident from Tables 4A and 4B that the asymmetry between the price impact of buys and
sells persists across different firm sizes. It is probably more difficult to maintain anonymity in trading
low capitalization stocks, since institutional participation in such stocks is generally quite low.
Accordingly, the market might interpret institutional purchases of smaller stocks as more reliable
indicators of favorable private information. Moreover, even a minor institutional stake in a small stock
might involve several successive trades, so that the market impact of an institutional purchase might be
spread out over several days, before a reversal occurs. Limited institutional holdings of smaller stocks
might also reduce the extent of arbitrage activity in these stocks. As a result, disruptions in demand are
less likely to be accommodated by additional supply from institutional arbitrageurs, resulting instead in
longer lasting price pressure. Sales by our sample of institutional money managers, on the other hand,
do not on average convey much new information to the market, even for the smallest stocks. Such sales
might represent money managers removing poorly performing small stocks from their portfolios in order
to avoid potentially embarrassing questions from their clients ("window dressing"). Investment policies
regarding minimum levels of market capitalization, dividend yield, or the number of analysts following a
stock, may prompt a manager to sell stocks even in the absence of unfavorable information.
In all the four size groups, the average price impact for buys and sells is small, particularly in
light of the lower prices of small stocks. The median return relative to either the open or close is zero
• for buy and sell orders carried out by institutions. In comparison to the three intra-day average price
benchmarks, institutional sales are associated with a slight downward pressure on prices. Contrary to
intuition, however, execution prices for buys do not differ by much from the average price benchmarks
14
and do not move with firm size in the expected direction. If anything, purchases of the smallest stocks
are carried out at prices more favorable than the intra-day average price. For the smallest firms, the
magnitude of the price impact of both buys and sells is sensitive to whether the trade is included in, or
excluded from, the volume-weighted average. Turning to commissions, although the percentage
commission cost falls with firm size, the dollar cost is almost the same across all size groups at about six
cents per share. The low magnitude of the numbers in Tables 4A and 4B stand in distinct contrast to
the estimates of Stoll and Whaley (1983), who report a simple mean for the quoted relative spread of
2 percent and a simple mean commission rate of 1.6 percent applicable for the smallest four deciles of
firm size.
One reason for the difference between the quoted spread reported by Stoll and Whaley (1983)
and the realized market impact of a trade (other than the different sample period) might be
opportunistic or strategic trading behavior on the part of institutional money managers. In particular,
the results for institutional purchases of the smallest stocks may be confounded by cross-sectional
differences in institutional trading strategies. Institutions that predominately trade in low capitalization
stocks may choose to buy only if a favorable, inexpensive opportunity presents itself (perhaps because the
quoted spreads and commissions are indeed high). In this latter case, purchases of lower capitalization
stocks may tend to be concentrated in a relatively small group of money managers, who appear to incur
low market impact costs because their buying behavior essentially supplies liquidity to sellers. Sellers of
small stocks, on the other hand, are more likely to come from a larger, more diffuse group of institutions,
including institutions selling stocks whose market values have declined in past periods. On average, such
sellers incur short-run liquidity costs which are larger for small firms.
4. The Role of Trade Difficulty
The comparative difficulty of a trade is another potential determinant of its impact on the stock
price. A commonly used indicator of trade complexity is the dollar value of the trade relative to normal
daily volume in the stock, A trade that is large in comparison with normal trading volume would be
more difficult to execute without incurring a large market impact, either because a larger concession is
necessary to attract immediately willing counterparties or because a large trade is a stronger signal of
private information. Models of informational asymmetry such as Easley and O'Hara (1987), Glosten
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(1989) suggest this latter reason. Tables 5A and 5B analyze the association between the price impact of
a trade and its complexity (relative size). The complexity of a transaction is defined as its principal
value, relative to average daily trading volume over a prior 40 day period (normal volume). On the basis
of relative size, trades are classified into one of four groups: trades accounting for more than 80 percent
of normal volume are categorized as the hardest trades; trades between 40 percent and 80 percent of
normal volume are placed in group 4; trades between 25 percent and 40 percent are placed in group 3;
trades between 10 percent and 25 percent of normal volume are placed in group 2 while trades which are
less than 10 percent of normal volume are classified as the easiest trades. These cut-off points were
chosen after extensive conversations with trading professionals and money managers as to what
constitutes a difficult trade.
The results in Table 5 are very similar to the results obtained earlier, when trades are classified
by firm size. In particular, the principal-weighted average permanent price change for purchases is
monotonically increasing in trade complexity, rising to 0.51 percent for the hardest trades.
The permanent price change for institutional sales is, on average, negative for all but the easiest trades,
and is larger (in absolute value) for more difficult trades. Even in the category of the hardest trades,
however, the average permanent impact is not particularly noteworthy: a sale which accounts for as
much as 80 percent or more of normal daily volume yields an average permanent price change of only
•0.15 percent, so that by the end of the day the stock price is only about four cents below its opening
price (given an average price of $25.9 per share for the hardest trades). These results for the open-to-
close price change confirm an association with trade size for buys, although the magnitude of the
permanent impact for both buys and sells is smaller than in Holthausen et al (1990).
Table 6 examines the behavior of the price impact of trades as both firm size and trade
complexity vary. Within each of the four categories of firm size (defined as in Table 1), trades are
divided into four groups by trade difficulty, using the quartiles of the distribution of trade size relative to
normal daily volume (as reported in Table 2, panel c). In order to avoid clutter, the table reports only
the principal-weighted averages for a subset of the price impact measures.
For institutional purchases, the permanent impact on prices ranges from 0.11 percent for the
easiest trades in the largest firms to 0.72 percent for the hardest trades in the smallest firms. The
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impact of even the hardest purchases of the smallest stocks is not particularly large, however, compared
to other researchers' estimates of the cost of trading small stocks in general. At the other end of the
scale of firm size, the permanent effect of institutional purchases of the largest stocks (where most
institutional trading is concentrated) tends to increase with trade difficulty; at its maximum, however,
this impact amounts to only 0.33 percent. The average permanent impact of institutional sales is, in
general, also not very noticeable. When the volume-weighted price is used as the benchmark, the price
impact provides very little basis for discriminating between trades with different characteristics: the
average impact of the easiest purchases in the largest stocks is -0.02 percent, while the average impact of
the hardest purchases of the smallest stocks is even more favorable at -0.08 percent.
All in all, the results for buys in Table 6 are consistent with the presence of information effects
or downward sloping demand curves due to imperfect substitution. Strategic buying behavior on the part
of money managers may help to account for the relatively low impact from the open in the case of the
smallest firms. Similarly, the ability of managers to cloak the information content of their purchases can
perhaps help to account for the absence of any strong correlation between the permanent price effect and
relative trade size. On the other hand, sell transactions are associated with only minor permanent price
changes. Any initial downward pressure on prices is generally reversed by the end of the trading day,
suggesting the existence of short-term liquidity costs.
5. Differences in Price Impact Across Money Managers
It may also be the case that the market impact of a transaction varies with the style of the
money manager and the competence of the trading desk responsible for the trade. Models of adverse
selection, for example, stress the difference between informed and uninformed mangers. In either case,
other strategic aspects of the trade, such as its size and timing, are subject to the influence of the
individual trader. Treynor (1981), Wagner (1989) describe how trading strategies might differ with
respect to demand for immediacy, whether the manager follows a positive feedback or negative feedback
strategy, as well as other less tangible factors. Admati and Pfleiderer (1989) show how the interaction
between the strategic trading behavior of informed speculators and discretionary liquidity traders can
account for intraday price patterns. Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1991) argue that money managers
with different trading strategies might offset one another's price impact, so that their aggregate
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influence is not necessarily destabilizing. Variation across managers in terms of their strategic behavior
and investment in a trading desk should give rise to differences across managers with respect to the
price impact of their purchases and sales.
An extended characterization of the various trading strategies adopted by different money
managers, together with their resulting impact on stock prices, is beyond the scope of this paper (see
Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1991)). Instead, in the subsequent analysis, we adopt the less
ambitious tack of only documenting the existence of dispersion across money managers with respect to
the price impact of their trades. In Table 7, summary statistics are presented for the distribution across
managers of three of our measures of price impact. For each of the 37 individual managers, the
different returns are calculated and then averaged (using trade principal as weights) across all the
manager's trades. The summary statistics in Table 7 are based on these 37 observations for each price
impact measure.
The performance of the median manager parallels our previous findings from Table 3.
Nonetheless, considerable variation exists across managers for both buys and sells under each measure of
price impact. This variation cannot be attributed simply to noise - the average price impact of each
manager is based upon tens of thousands of trades, so that the precision of each estimate is high. For
example, the execution performance for buys relative to the opening price varies from -0.46 percent in
the tenth percentile to 0.54 percent in the ninetieth percentile, yielding a difference of a full percentage
point per transaction. The corresponding difference for sells is very similar, at 0.98 percent per
transaction. Insofar as the opening price is known if and when a manager chooses to trade, the
differences across managers in their execution performance relative to the open reflects several sources:
their differential skill in seeking out liquidity; ability in trading before the release of information; as well
as differences in their responses to price movements subsequent to the opening. The dispersion across
managers, in terms of the post-trade return till the close, is also notable but substantially lower . For
buys (sells), the tenth percentile is -0.01 percent (0.01 percent) and the ninetieth percentile is
0.25 percent (0.26 percent), giving rise to a difference of 0.26 percent (0.27 percent) per transaction.
Given that the manager has already traded, the post-trade return will vary across managers only to the
extent that the market price responds differently to their trades In this respect, the dispersion in
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managers' post-trade returns is expected to be smaller than the dispersion in their pre-trade execution
performance.
Our confidence that the differences across managers can be ascribed to differences in trading
strategy, rather than noise, would be heightened if a manager who obtains favorable execution for buys
also fares well for sells. This is indeed the case: the rank correlation across managers between
performance for buys and sells relative to the opening price is -0.84, -0.10 for performance relative to the
closing price and -0.74 for the permanent price change. In other words, a manager who buys low
relative to the opening price (or relative to the closing price) also tends to sell high relative to the
opening price (or relative to the closing price). These findings are consistent with the price impact of
buys and sells being influenced by a common variable such as a manager's execution ability.
6. Regression Results
Following the lead of previous theoretical and empirical research, the previous sections confirm
the influence of firm size and trade difficulty on the price impact of a trade. In addition, the unique
features of our dataset enable us to suggest another potential influence, namely the identity of the
manager behind each trade. It is thus natural to ask whether, after controlling for firm size and trade
difficulty, the manager's identity still remains as an important determinant of a trade's price impact.
There may also be a trade-off between the commission cost and the market impact of the trade. These
various influences are accommodated in the following regression model:
;=1 j=\ ;=1
For each trade i, r
s
is one of the three measures of price impact that we focus on: the percentage return
from the open to the trade, from the trade to the close, and from the open to the close. The commission
cost for the ith trade is denoted by Cj, and following the common practice in the investment industry, is
measured in cents per share (Marshall, 1988). It is more likely that the manager's trading desk
perceives the trade-off (if any exists) in terms of the dollar commission cost, rather than in terms of the
commission rate.7 The effects of market capitalization, trade difficulty and managerial strategy are
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captured by the dummy variables, S^, D,j and M,,, respectively. For example, M,j takes the value of one
if the ith trade is executed by the jth manager and is zero otherwise. To permit identification, the
coefficients for the dummy variables for managers are normalized relative to the first manager in the
data set. Similarly, the coefficients for the trade difficulty variables are expressed relative to the impact
of trades in the first category (the easiest trades), while the coefficients for firm size are expressed
relative to the impact of trades in the largest firms. Separate regressions are fit to the price impact of
buy transactions, and to the impact of sell transactions. In addition, the marginal explanatory power of
each set of dummy variables is assessed by excluding each set, one at a time, from the full model (1).
Panel A of Table 8 reports the adjusted R2 for each specification of the regression model. For a
given measure of price impact, a comparison of the different specifications indicates that most of the
explanatory power of the model comes from the identity of the individual money manager behind the
trade. In contrast, excluding the dummy variables for firm size and trade complexity has little or no
effect on the R2 . In light of the importance of the manager dummies, it is perhaps not surprising that
the model provides the best fit in the equation for the return from the open to the trade. This measure
of price impact, to a larger extent than the others reflects the effects of managerial trading strategy.
In panel B, the coefficients of the full model are reported for each of the three measures of price
impact. Given the very large sample size nearly all of the estimated coefficients are large relative to
their standard errors. Therefore, the focus of the discussion will be on the economic significance of the
coefficients.
One presumption is that favorable execution (lower price impact) is purchased from a broker in
exchange for a higher commission fee. However, the coefficient for the commission cost variable for both
buys and for sells (in parentheses) is negligible, regardless of the measure of price impact, and in many
cases has the wrong sign. The most favorable evidence on substitution between the price impact of a
trade and its commission cost emerges in the equation for the price impact of sells relative to the closing
price. Even in this case, however, an increase in the commission of one cent per share (in itself a large
jump in commissions) lowers the post-trade price reversal by 0.007 percent, yielding a dollar savings of
only 0.3 cents per share on a stock with the average price of $36.50. As pointed out in Beebower (1989),
however, the lack of a relation between commission payments and price impact does not imply that the
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compensation to the broker is independent of the services provided to the manager. Some brokers, for
example, may commit their own capital to accommodate managers' trades, while others may simply
process transactions. While the commission payments to these two groups may not differ greatly, the
manager may instead direct easier trades in large stocks to the second group, receiving in exchange "soft-
dollar" rebates in the form of brokers' research services or brokers' assumption of some of the client's
expenses. Such rebates are less likely in the case of brokers with more extensive investments in
execution capability.
With respect to the influence of firm size and complexity, the results in panel B confirm the
findings of the previous sections. What is particularly noteworthy, however, is that the coefficients of the
dummy variables for money managers still display considerable dispersion—for buys the spread between
the tenth and ninetieth percentiles runs from 0.26 when returns are measured after the trade to 0.72
when pre-trade returns are considered. Similarly, money managers' execution performance for sells can
differ greatly—the spread between the tenth and ninetieth percentiles of the coefficients for the manager
dummies ranges from 0.34 (relative to the closing price) to 0.87 (relative to the permanent impact).
While somewhat attenuated relative to the findings of table 7, these spreads are still considerable.
IV. The Execution Cost of Institutional Trades
The results of the previous section on the price impact of institutional transactions also provide
evidence on the costs to institutional investors for executing equity trades. In particular, the difference
between the price at which an order is executed and the underlying true value of the stock amounts to a
price concession which is a cost of trading, in addition to brokerage commissions. Within the investment
industry, considerable resources, in the form of salaries for professional traders and the costs of
computers and communications equipment, are expended on monitoring and controlling such trading
costs. Further, researchers who wish to evaluate the profitability of different trading rules must grapple
with the costs of transacting under such rules. Nonetheless, there is remarkably little agreement as to
the magnitude of execution costs. Several authors, using a variety of different methodologies and
samples, have reported estimates of trading costs. Demsetz (1968) reports a total cost (spread plus
commission) of 1.3 percent; Condon (1981) finds average execution and commission costs of 0.55 percent
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and 0.32 percent, respectively; Stoll and Whaley (1983) document average spreads of 0.69 percent for the
largest stocks (2.93% for the smallest) and commissions of 1.01 percent (1.92%); Loeb (1983) reports
round-trip costs between 1 and 8 percent for the largest stocks; Stoll (1991) using data on aggregate
revenues for the securities industry, finds that market impact and commission costs over the 1980s
averaged 0.11 percent and 0.45 percent, respectively, on exchange-listed stocks.
Much of the disagreement stems from the difficulty of specifying a benchmark price.8 An
obvious candidate is the closing price of the stock on the trade date; another is its opening price.
Alternatively, some intra-day average of transaction prices (such as the volume-weighted average price)
can be used. In this sense, the temporary and total price impact of institutional trades, and the impact
relative to various intra-day averages, reported in the previous section, yield average execution costs for
purchases and sales. In Table 3, average round-trip costs include commissions which are 0.34 percent of
trade value, and market impact costs; these range from 0.09 percent relative to the volume-weighted
price to 0.36 percent relative to the opening price. When the closing price is used as the benchmark, the
cost of sells is roughly offset, on average, by a benefit for buys, since there is a post-purchase average
price continuation. Further, when the estimates of trading cost are disaggregated by market
capitalization and trade complexity, the average market impact costs are smaller than the corresponding
figures in Loeb (1983) or Stoll and Whaley (1983). In addition, the costs relative to the open tend to
move with market capitalization and trade complexity in the expected direction. Costs relative to the
volume-weighted price, however, display very little variation across trades in large and small stocks, or
across difficult and easy trades.
The various measures of execution cost are, nonetheless, not without shortcomings. The opening
price may not be a relevant benchmark price if the order is not given to the trader for execution before
trading begins. To one degree or another, each cost measure can be manipulated by gaming behavior on
the part of managers who are being evaluated. A manager can postpone trading until close to the end of
the trading day and then choose to execute only those transactions whose prices are better than the open
or the intra-day average price; the remaining orders are deferred indefinitely. Similarly, a manager who
carries out a large transaction will have a major influence on the volume-weighted price, distorting the
cost calculation—for example, in Tables 4A and 4B, the cost of buys (sells) in the category of the smallest
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firms is -0.08 percent (0.12%) relative to the volume-weighted average price; when the trade itself is
excluded from the benchmark, the cost is higher at -0.05 percent (0.35% for sells). None of these cost
measures address the issue of opportunity cost (including the cost of unexecuted orders), or the potential
adverse selection problem (the possibility that the manager may be "bagged" by buying cheaply a stock
which subsequently experiences negative performance). It would thus seem advisable to consider a broad
range of cost measures, rather than focussing on a single number, for purposes of evaluating execution
performance.
V. Summary and Conclusion
The extent to which trades affect stock prices is of great interest to financial researchers and
investment managers. Analysis of the price impact of institutional trades sheds light on the elasticity of
the excess demand curve for stocks, and on the magnitude of the cost of executing transactions.
Previous studies on the price impact of trades, however, have focussed on the effects of block trades and
in some cases, have considered only the largest blocks. In these studies, moreover, the change in the
transaction price itself is used to infer whether a trade is initiated by the buyer or by the seller. In
contrast, our sample covers a more recent period and contains more than a million trades both large and
small, by 37 large institutional money managers. Each trade is explicitly identified as a purchase or sale
by the money manager, who is also identified.
The distinctive features of our data set enable us to generalize and extend previous studies on
the price impact of block trades. Overall, the evidence suggests that institutional purchases and sales of
a stock are associated with some pressure on prices, where the price impact is measured using a variety
of benchmarks. Relative to the opening price on the trade date, for example, buy transactions are
associated with a principal-weighted average price increase of 0.22 percent while sell transactions are
associated with a principal-weighted average price decline of 0.14 percent. The behavior of prices from
the open to the trade can be attributable to short-run liquidity costs, prior release of information or
positive feedback trading behavior by managers.
The post-trade behavior of prices is more perplexing, and displays a sharp difference for buys as
opposed to sells. Specifically, the price continues to rise after purchases - the principal-weighted average
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return from the trade to the same-day closing price is 0.12 percent - while the price tends to correct
itself after sales - the principal-weighted average return from the trade to the close in this case is 0.10
percent. The post-trade reversal for sells is consistent with the existence of short-run liquidity costs,
while the post-purchase behavior of prices is consistent with information effects, or imperfectly elastic
demand curves.
As in Kraus and Stoll (1972), Holthausen et al. (1987), we find that institutional purchases are
associated with a principal-weighted permanent price change from the open to the close on the trade
date of 0.34 percent, while there is only a very small permanent impact (-0.04 percent) from institutional
sales. The difference between the price impact of buys and sells cannot be attributed to positive
feedback trading. Rather, an analysis of the open-to-close price change on the Standard & Poor's Index
provides some evidence that money managers might trade in a contrarian fashion.
Several conjectures are offered to account for the asymmetry between the price impact of buys
versus sells. Institutional sales are more likely to involve an intermediary broker, compared to
institutional purchases. Hence the price impact of sells is more likely to reflect a temporary discount as
compensation for the intermediary. On the other hand, institutional purchases might be a stronger
signal of favorable information, whereas there are many potential liquidity-motivated reasons to dispose
of a stock. Finally, a manger who is reluctant to "miss the boat" will not be deterred from buying a stock
if its price rises, while declines in the stock price may prompt a manager to defer selling. Much further
research, however, is called for in accounting for the differences between the effects of buys and sells.
Considerable attention in previous research has focused on the effects of market capitalization
and relative trade size as determinants of the market impact of a trade. We find that the market impact
of a trade is indeed related to these influences, although its magnitude is considerably smaller than in
previous work. For example, the principal-weighted average return from the open to the trade for the
hardest trades in the smallest stocks is only 0.23 percent for buys and -0.57 for sells. Moreover in a
multiple regression, we find that the importance of market capitalization and trade difficulty pales in
comparison to the influence of the money manager who is behind the trade. Considerable differences are
observed across managers with respect to the price impact of their trades.
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The results on the price impact of institutional trades provide some insight on the much debated
topic of the cost of executing trades. Our highest estimates of round-trip costs are obtained when the
opening price is used as the benchmark. Even in this case, however, the round-trip market impact cost
is only 0.36 percent, which is definitely on the low side of previous estimates. To put this cost estimate
in perspective, suppose that each purchase or sale results in giving up only one tick, so that round-trip
costs equal twenty-five cents. For a typical stock (price $36.50) the round-trip market impact cost
should be in this case 0.68 percent; almost double our estimate. Given the competitiveness of the
investment industry and the substantial resources expended on trading facilities, it should perhaps not
come as a total surprise that money managers are loath to give up as much as an eighth every time that
they execute a trade.
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Footnotes
'If an institution sold (bought) a large number of shares (such as 50,000 shares), there
might be more than one party on the other side of the trade. In our dataset, such a
transaction would be reported as a single trade.
2Past studies of block trading use data from earlier periods (no later than 1983); dramatic
changes have since occurred in equity markets. Relative to the early 1980s, the volume of
trading has doubled while percentage commission costs are at half their former levels;
alternative mechanisms such as off-floor trading on computerized networks have begun to
compete with the specialist system; the emergence of options and futures markets have
allowed institutional investors to hedge security risks, arguably allowing them to devote more
attention to reducing market impact.
3We also replicated the analysis in Table 3 for buys and sells, using a variety of alternative
benchmark prices, such as the volume-weighted price excluding large trades (those over a
thousand shares or those accounting for more than 30 percent of daily volume), or a randomly
selected transaction price from the trade date. The results are qualitatively similar to those
using the simple average price as a benchmark, and so are not reported.
*There is some evidence that the closing price may not be an entirely representative price
for use as a benchmark. Wood, Mclnish and Ord (1985), Harris (1989) document that returns
on the closing transaction are on average positive and relatively large; Harris (1989) also
finds an increase in both closing bid and ask prices, as well as an increase in the frequency of
ask prices at the close. The day-end pattern in transaction prices may thus account for part
of the post-trade price change. However, there is still evidence of a price continuation
subsequent to buys and a reversal subsequent to sells when the next-to-closing price is used as
the benchmark: the principal-weighted average is 0.09 percent for buys and 0.07 percent for
sells.
sThe reluctance of intermediaries to undertake short positions gives rise to a further
possibility. In particular, the pool of counterparties facing a buyer is likely to be more
concentrated than the pool of possible counterparties facing a seller. Sellers can thus exploit
the potential competition among a larger group of counterparties to obtain a smaller price
concession, while buyers have a more limited set of parties on the other side (namely, existing
shareholders). As another extension to this argument, it may be the case that existing holders
of a stock tend to be more optimistic about its future prospects, relative to other investors.
Shleifer and Summers (1990) argue that limitations on arbitrage can lead to differences
between the price of a stock and its true value. The buyer of a stock must thus offer a higher
premium to induce current holders to part with their shares.
6On the other hand, it might be argued that there is a continuous net inflow of funds into
institutional accounts, in the form of pension contributions, receipt of dividend and interest
income, etc. Buying activity on the part of institutions therefore need not be entirely
information-motivated
.
'Expressing the commission cost relative to the trade price would also confound the effect
of commissions with the effect of market capitalization (since smaller stocks tend to have
lower prices).
'Harris (1990) surveys various methods for measuring execution costs. Hasbrouck (1990),
Hasbrouck and Schwartz (1988) develop alternative procedures for inferring execution costs.
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Table 7
Summary statistics for distribution across managers of measures of price impact, of buys and sells (in
parentheses) based on principal-weighted averages across trades of each of 37 institutional money
management firms. Price impact is the return (in percent): from the opening price to the trade,
from the trade to the closing price, and from the opening to closing. Sample comprises all trades of
NYSE and AMEX stocks made by 37 institutional money management firms from July 1, 1986 to
December 30, 1988 (excluding October 1987).
Return (in percent) from:
Opening Trade to Opening
price , closing to
to trade price closing
Average by principal 0.22 (-0.14) 0.12 ( 0.10) 0.34 (-0.04)
Mean 0.13 (-0.04) 0.12 ( 0.12) 0.24 ( 0.08)
Standard deviation 0.45 ( 0.37) 0.13 ( 0.09) 0.42 ( 0.42)
Median 0.20 (-0.09) 0.13 (0.11) 0.32 ( 0.04)
10-percentile -0.46 (-0.46) -0.01 ( 0.01) -0.39 (-0.36)
25-percentile 0.01 (-0.31) 0.04 ( 0.05) 0.04 (-0.22)
75-percentile 0.37 ( 0.14) 0.17 ( 0.15) 0.53 ( 0.27)
90-percentile 0.54 ( 0.52) 0.25 ( 0.26) 0.75 ( 0.78)
Range between
10 and 90 percentiles 1.00 ( 0.98) 0.26 ( 0.27) 1.14 ( 1.14)
Table 8
Regression estimates of the model,
r, =
/-i
36
7-1
where r, is the return (in %) from:
y-i
the open to the trade, from the trade to the close, and from the open to the close.
C, is the dollar commission cost; Su is a dummy variable for the trade's classification by market capitalization; D tJ is a
dummy variable for the trade's classification by complexity; Mjj is a dummy variable for the money manager. The
equation is estimated separately for buys and for sells. The sample comprises all trades of NYSE and AMEX stocks
made by 37 institutional money management firms from July 1, 1986 to December 30, 1988 (excluding October
1987).
A. Adjusted R2 (in percent) for full model, and models with each set of dummy variables
excluded one set at a time. Results from the equation for sells are in parentheses.
Return (in %) from:
Full model
Excluding manager effects
Excluding size effects
Excluding complexity effects
Opening price Trade to Opening to
to trade Closing price closing:
3.45 ( 3.36) 0.70 ( 0.53) 1.74 ( 1.39)
0.43 ( 0.26) 0.35 ( 0.17) 0.36 ( 0.10)
3.45 ( 3.31) 0.48 ( 0.51) 1.61 ( 1.34)
3.33 ( 3.34) 0.70 ( 0.42) 1.70 ( 1.38)
B. Estimated efficients for full model for buys and for sells (in parentheses)
Return (in %) from:
Opening price Trade to Opening to
Explanatory variable to trade Closing; price closing;
Intercept 0.17 (-0.32) 0.00 ( 0.15) 0.18 (-0.18)
Commission 0.00 (-0.00) -0.00 (-0.01) -0.00 (-0.01)
Size 1 (smallest) 0.01 (-0.21) 0.30 (-0.07) 0.30 (-0.28)
2 0.02 (-0.04) 0.16 (-0.04) 0.18 (-0.01)
3 (large) -0.00 (-0.00) 0.07 ( 0.01) 0.07 ( 0.01)
Complexity 2 (easy) 0.08 (-0.03) -0.02 ( 0.05) 0.06 ( 0.02)
3 0.15 (-0.07) -0.06 ( 0.12) 0.10 ( 0.05)
4 0.20 (-0.09) -0.05 ( 0.13) 0.15 ( 0.04)
5 (hardest) 0.22 (-0.11) -0.00 ( 0.29) 0.22 ( 0.17)
Manager
10-percentile -0.52 (-0.15) 0.00 (-0.34) -0.41 (-0.33)
25-percentile -0.25 (-0.04) 0.07 (-0.26) -0.14 (-0.19)
Median -0.12 ( 0.15) 0.12 (-0.18) 0.01 ( 0.03)
75 percentile 0.03 (0.44) 0.22 (-0.09) 0.20 ( 0.22)
90-percentile 0.20 ( 0.70) 0.26 ( 0.00) 0.28 (0.54)
Range between
10 and 90 percentiles 0.72 ( 0.85) 0.26 ( 0.34) 0.69 ( 0.87)
BUYS
CP
VW
OP
Time
SELLS
Time
Figure 1. Principal-weighted average differences (in percent) between trade price (TP) and
opening price (OP), closing price (CP), and volume-weighted average price (VW) for
institutional purchases and sales.
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